Due Process Protections for Tenants in Section 8 Assisted Housing: Prospects for a Good Cause Eviction Standard by Heen, Mary L.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
5-1978
Due Process Protections for Tenants in Section 8
Assisted Housing: Prospects for a Good Cause
Eviction Standard
Mary L. Heen
University of Richmond, mheen@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Housing Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary L. Heen, Due Process Protections for Tenants in Section 8 Assisted Housing: Prospects for a Good Cause Eviction Standard, 12
Clearinghouse Rev. 1 (1978).
DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR TENANTS IN 
SECTION 8 ASSISTED HOUSING: 
PROSPECTS FOR A GOOD CAUSE EVICTION STANDARD 
by Mary L. Heen 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SECTION 8 PROGRAM 
AND HUD'S RETREAT FROM DUE PROCESS 
PROTECTIONS FOR TENANTS 
The Section 8 assisted housing program,' devised as an 
alternative to the heavily criticized conventional public 
housing 2 and FHA subsidized housing programs,J was 
introduced in 19744 as the federal government's major low 
income housing program.s The twofold purpose of the 
program, as expressed by Congress, is to promote 
economically mixed housing and to aid lower income families 
obtain a decent place to live. 6 
* 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Researcher (part-time), National Housing Law Project, 2150 
Shattuck Ave., Berkeley, Cal. 94704. The author is grateful 
for comments on earlier drafts of this article made by 
Catherine M. Bishop, staff attorney, National Housing Law 
Project. 
42 U.S.C. §1437f (Supp. 1977), §201(a)8 of the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1974 (Section 8 of the 
revised United States Housing Act of 1937). 
42 U.S.C. §§1401-1436 (1973). See general(v. Friedman 
Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview. 54 CALIF. L. 
REV. 642 (1966). 
12 U.S.C. §1715/(d)(3) for §221(d)(3), Below Market Inter-
est Rate Program, Housing Act of 1961. 12 U.S.C. §1715z-I 
for §236, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. 
FHA subsidy programs are directed toward encouraging the 
production of low and moderate income units by private 
enterprise. See genera/(1'. Hearing on the Suspension of 
Subsidized Housing Programs Before the Subcommiltee on 
Housing of the House &inking and Currency Comm .. 92d 
Cong., I st Sess. 55 (1974). 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 
667 (1974). 
See Senate Report (Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee) No. 93-693 (to accompany S.3066) Feb. 27, 
1974. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS, 
93d Cong. 2d Sess. at 4314-4317, 4360. 
42 U.S.C. §1437f(a) (Supp. 1977). 
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The concept of Section 8 evolved from the Section 23 7 
leased housing program established by the Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1965. s Under the Section 23 existing 
housing9 program, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) enters into annual contributions 
contracts with local public housing agencies which in turn 
lease privately owned units for "sublet" to low income 
tenants. to Section 8" utilizes a modified approach 12 both for 
the leasing of existing privately owned units 13 and for assisting 
new construction and substantial rehabilitation of housing 
units. 
Under the Section 8 existing housing program, HUD 
enters into annual contributions contracts with public housing 
7. 42 U.S.C. §1421b (Supp. 1970). 
8. §103(a), 79 Stat. 455 (1965). 
9. The original Section 23 program had a limited new con-
struction and substantial rehabilitation component in addi-
tion to the existing housing component. See HUD, Low 
Rent Leased Housing Handbook 7430.1, Ch. I, §I , 3(d) 
and 6 (1969). Current Section 23 program regulations are 
found in 24 C.F.R. §§800, 801, 802. 803 et seq. These 
regulations differ considerably from those of the original 
program, but are very similar to the Section 8 regulations. 
10. See general(I'. Friedman & Krier, A New lease on lJfe: 
Section 23 Housing and the Poor, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 611 
(1968); Palmer, Section 23 Housing: Low-Rent Housing in 
Private Accommodations. 48 J. URBAN L. 255 (1970). 
11. For an introduction to the Section 8 program, See Bishop, 
Assisted Housing Under the Housing and Community De-
velopment Act of 1974, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 679 
(Jan. Supp. 1975). 
12. For a comparison of the Section 8 and Section 23 programs, 
see general£v, Note, Federal l.Rased Housing Assistance in 
Private Accommodations: Section 8, 8 UNIV. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 676 (1975); Note, The New Leased Housing 
Program: How Tenantable A Proposition? 26 HASTINGS. 
L. J. 1145 (1975). 
13. The original Section 23 program provides for leases be-
tween the private owner and the local housing authority, 
with the PHA subletting to the tenant, or leases in the form 
of a PHA contract with the owner and the tenant. See, 
HUD, Low-Rent Leased Housing Handbook No. 7430.1, 
Ch. 3 §2 'I I (1969). 
2 
agencies (PH As) which then may contract to make assistance 
payments to owners. 14 Tenants lease units directly from the 
owner, with the PH A paying the cash difference between 15 or 
25 percent of the tenants' income and a "fair market rent."IS 
The structure of the Section 8 existing housing program, even 
more clearly than that of the Section 23 program, results in 
tenants receiving what could be described as a "welfare 
benefit" enabling them to find decent housing at a cost based 
on a percentage of income. 
Under the Section 8 new construction and substantial 
rehabilitation program, HUD enters into contracts with 
owners or prospective owners who agree to construct or 
rehabilitate housing for occupancy partially or totally by low 
income families. HUD then makes assistance payments 
directly to owners. Alternatively, HUD may enter into annual 
contributions contracts with PHAs which then enter into 
contracts to make assistance payments to owners. 16 
The Section 8 private owner retains much greater 
control over tenant selection and eviction than the Section 23 
owner. In the existing housing -program, the owner selects 
tenants, subject to the terms of the annual contributions 
contract between HUD and the PHA, and establishes 
standard maintenance and repair practices. The PHA has the 
sole right to evict, however, with the owner having the right to 
seek PHA authorization for termination of tenancy.11 For 
newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated housing, the 
owner assumes all ownership, maintenance, and management 
responsibilities, including selection and eviction of ten~nts. is 
By granting Section 8 owners more control over tenant 
selection and eviction, 19 HUD has failed to require many 
protections for tenants which are now well established in its 
other low income housing programs. For example, HUD 
requires public housing agencies20 and private owners of FHA 
subsidized housing projects21 to establish "good cause," such 
as non-payment of rent or other substantial violation of the 
lease, before a tenant may be evicted. Procedural protections 
are also required. Tenants in both public housing and 
subsidized housing must be given written notice of the reasons 
for the eviction. In addition, public housing tenants are 
14. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(b)(I). 
15. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(c)(2)(C)(3). 
16. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(b)(2). 
17. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(d)(l). 
18. 42 U.S.C. §1437(e)(2). 
19. Evictions pose a particularly distressing problem because 
of the severe shortage of decent low cost housing in the 
private market. E.g .. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 
428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 
925 (1970) (warranty of habitability implicit in private 
rental housing in part due to conditions arising from a 
severe shortage of rental housing); Green v. Superior Court 
of the City and County of San Francisco, 10 Cal.3d 616, 
625 (1974). 
20. 24 C.F.R. §§866, et seq. 
21. 24 C.F.R. §§450, et seq .. 41 Fed. Reg. 16924 (April 22, 
1976), and 41 Fed. Reg. 43329 (Sept. 30, 1976). These 
regulations also are applicable to HUD held units and to 
projects rece1vmg §IOI rent supplement payments, 
§221(d)(5) below market interest rates and §202 direct 
loans. The regulations were published to "harmonize" HUD 
policies with court decisions requiring good cause eviction. 
entitled to an informal hearing before eviction and a trial de 
novo on the issue of good cause. 
The impetus for HUD's issuance of these good cause 
regulations came from tenant-initiated suits. 22 The leading 
cases of Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority23 and 
Joy v. Daniels, 24 decided soon after the Supreme Court's 
landmark opinion of Goldberg v. Kelly, 2s established the 
principle of an entitlement to continued occupancy in federally 
assisted housing and the necessity for a hearing on the issue of 
"cause" prior to an eviction by either a public housing agency 
or a private landlord receiving FHA mortgage assistance. 
In its administration of the Section 8 program, HUD has 
demonstrated very little initiative in protecting Section 8 
tenants from potentially arbitrary actions by landlords. 26 
Although present Section 8 regulations do not prohibit the 
establishment of a good cause hearing requirement by local 
housing authorities or private owners, 21 in practice, local 
housing authorities and private landlords have interpreted the 
. regulations to require nothing more than written notice to the 
tenant. 
Because the Section 8 program was designed to attract 
private participation in a program of economically mixed 
housing, it poses special problems and obstacles to Section 8 
tenants who, in the absence of HUD action, may turn to the 
courts for protection from arbitrary evictions. This article 
seeks to examine those difficulties and explore arguments for 
establishment of a Section 8 due process good cause eviction 
standard similar to that already judicially established for 
conventional public housing and for the FHA subsidized 
housing program. 
22. Conventional public housing: e.g., Escalera v. New York 
City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied. 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Caulder v. Durham Housing 
Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 
U.S. 1003 (1971); notice, informal hearing, trial de novo 
and good cause eviction now required by HUD regulation. 
See, 24 C.F.R. §§866, et seq., §236 subsidized housing: 
e.g., Anderson v. Denny, 365 F.Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973); 
Bonner v. Park Lake H.D.F.C., 333 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1972). 
Section 221 (d)(3) subsidized housing: e.g., Joy v. Daniels, 
479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); McClellan v. University 
Heights, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 374 (D. R.I. 1972); McQueen v. 
Druker, 317 F.Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), See 24 C.F.R. 
§§450 et seq. Redevelopment authority housing: Lopez v. 
Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 
1974). 
23. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 
( 1970). 
24. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973). 
25. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
26. In fact, HUD encourages public housing agencies (PHAs) 
to emphasize to prospective Section 8 owners the fact that 
the program permits a 30-day termination clause in the 
lease and the PHA's record of cooperation in authorizing 
evict ions in order to increase private landlord participation 
in the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. See Notice 
H 77-13 (PHA} Appendix I, pp. 4, 21 (April 1977). 
27. New construction, 24 C.F.R. §880.220; substantial rehabilita-
tion, 24 C.F.R. §881.220; existing housing, 24 C.F.R. 
§§882.215 and 882.107, 41 Fed. Reg. 19879 (May 13, 1976); 
set-asides for HUD-owned or subsidized projects, 24 C.F.R. 
§§886.122, 886.128, 42 Fed. Reg. 5601 (Jan. 28, 1977). but 
cf 24 C.F.R. §§450 et seq., 41 Fed. Reg. 43329 (Sept. 30, 
1976). 
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A major obstacle to the establishment of a Section 8 
good cause eviction standard, as indicated by the development 
of the good cause eviction standard for other low income 
housing programs, will be showing the requisite "state or 
governmental action" sufficient to invoke jurisdiction2B over a 
Section 8 private landlord and to provide tenants with due 
process protections. Part II of this article examines the various 
Section 8 subprograms in light of recent Supreme Court 
decisions which impose significant limitations on the state 
action doctrine. 
The establishment of a good cause eviction standard is 
discussed in Part Ill of the article in terms of tenants' 
entitlement to continued occupancy of the Section 8 unit and 
the appropriate procedural mechanisms to protect against 
deprivation of the Section 8 benefit without due process of law. 
The likelihood of establishing the requirement of a good cause 
hearing prior to eviction is considered under the standards 
suggested by recent due process decisions. 
Any discussion of the Section 8 program is complicated 
by the number of separate Section 8 subprograms, i.e., existing 
housing, 29 newconstruction3o and substantial rehabilitation,3 1 
each with its own set of regulations and relationships with 
HUD. There is an existing housing program for private owners 
and for HUD-owned or subsidized units. This latter program 
is called the set-aside or special allocations program.32 The 
28. The Civil Rights Act's jurisdictional statute, 24 U.S.C. 
§1343(3)(4) used in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. §1983, the 
substantive law prohibiting violations of civil rights under 
color of state law, provides federal jurisdiction over rights 
otherwise protected by the fourteenth amendment. The 
Civil Rights Act requirement that there be action "under 
color of law" and the fourteenth amendment requirement 
tbat there be "state action" are virtually identical. See, 
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). Since 
there is no jurisdictional amount required under either 28 
U.S.C. §§1343(3) or (4), the principal obstacle to federal 
court jurisdiction remains the establishment of "state action" 
and violation of a constitutional or statutory right. 
Jurisdiction over the private landlord should also be 
alleged under 28 U.S.C. §1331(a), federal question juris-
diction, e.g .. Anderson v. Denny, 365 F.Supp. 1254 (W.D. 
Va. 1973); Lawrence v. Oakes, 361 F.Supp. 432 (D. Vt. 
1973); 28 U.S.C. §1337, commerce clause jurisdiction, 
e.g .. Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1365 (3rd Cir. 1974), 
Ross v. Community Services, Inc., 396 F.Supp. 278 (D. Md. 
1975); but see. Potrero Hill Community Action Committee 
v. Housing Authority, 410 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1969) (no 
§ 1377 jurisdiction because despite some incidental effects on 
commerce, Housing Acts constitute welfare legislation for 
purposes of § 1337). Jurisdiction over the Secretary of HUD 
may be alleged under 28 U.S.C. §1361 (mandamus jurisdic-
tion), see Paulsen v. Coachlight Apts. Co., 507 F.2d 401 n.2 
(6th Cir. 1974); Langevin v. Chenango Ct. Inc., 447 F.2d 
296, 300 (2d Cir. 1971) (joinder of private landlord per-
missible in FHA housing mandamus action). For more 
detailed discussion of jurisdiction questions in public housing 
and FHA housing cases, see LAW PROJ. BULL., IV, 4, 
pp. 4-6. 
29. 24 C.F.R. §§882 et seq .. 42 Fed. Reg. 19879 (May 13, 1976). 
30. 24 C.F.R. §§880 et seq. 
31. 24 C.F.R. §§881 et seq. The "New Construction and Sub-
stantial Rehabilitation" regulations are virtually identical. 
32. 24 C.F.R. §§886 et seq. 
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new construction or substantial rehabilitation program may 
be implemented by private developers, private developers 
operating in conjunction with a public housing agency (PHA), 
by a PH A acting alone, or by a state housing finance agency. 
Presently, tenants receive full procedural protections only 
when faced with eviction from Section 8 set-aside units that are 
attached to H VD-owned or subsidized units. 33 The following 
discussion therefore concentrates on Section 8 units which are 
rented to tenants by private owners or private developers 
(exclusive of the HUD subsidized units described above). 
Although there has been little reported 34 litigation of the 
Section 8 good cause eviction issue up to now, as the Section 8 
program develops, 35 it will become a critical question for 
HUD, private owners, and low income tenants to resolve. It is 
likely that in the next few years a grnwing number of courts 
will be faced with the difficulttask of balancing the sometimes 
conflicting goals of national housing policy with the rights of 
individual Section 8 low income tenants. 
II. SECTION 8 AND ST A TE ACTION 
The maxim that the fourteenth amendment imposes 
restrictions on governmental action but not on the private 
behavior of individuals was first discussed extensively over 90 
years ago in the Civil Rights Cases. 36 The Supreme Court held 
that the wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by state 
authority, is simply a private wrong.37 With purely private 
action removed from the operation of the fourteenth 
amendment, the courts began to search for indications of 
"state" authority. 
33. 24 C.F.R. §§450 et seq. But see, 24 C.F.R. §§886.122 and 
886.128, 42 Fed. Reg. 5601 (January 28, 1977). The conflict 
between the two sets of regulations has not yet been re-
solved by HUD. The regulations are ambiguous as to 
whether the good cause standard would apply to a tenant 
residing in a federally subsidized unit with a Section 8 
existing housing certificate (24 C.F.R. §882.102) rather than 
a Section 8 set-aside unit. 
34. Consent judgments have been entered in suits challenging 
Section 8 eviction and termination of assistance procedures: 
Belcher v. Jefferson County Housing Authority, No. 
C77-0137-L(B) (W.D. Ky., Oct. 28, 1977) (consent judgment 
outlines eviction procedures for Section 8 private owners 
and requires the housing authority to hold a good cause 
hearing prior to eviction); Smith v. Angelo, No. 77-1740-M 
(D. Mass., Oct. 19, 1977) (consent judgment establishes a 
good cause standard for termination of assistance and out-
lines notice requirements and hearing procedures to be 
followed in Section 8 assistance termination). See 11 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., 744-745 (Dec. 1977). 
35. In fiscal year 1976, 290,000 Section 8 units ( 125,000 units of 
new construction or rehabilitation and 165,000 units of 
existing housing) were reserved by sponsors and slated for 
federal subsidy. See, HUD Programs, U.S. Dept. of Housing 
and Urban Development, 40 (Washington, D.C. March 
1977). 
HUD submitted budget authority and contract authority 
requests to Congress in 1978 sufficient to finance 344,000 
Section 8 units (110,000 new construction, 70,000 substantial 
rehabilitation, 39,000 moderate rehabilitation and 125,000 
existing). See 5 HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT RE-
PORTER 779 (January 23, 1978). 
36. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
37. Id. at 11. 
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In deciding whether conduct is governmental or private 
in nature, courts have relied on a case-by-case analysis rather 
than on clear-cut guidelines. 38 Nevertheless, two distinct 
approaches have emerged: the "state involvement" approach 
and the "public function" approach. 39 The two major Section 8 
programs, existing housing and new construction/ substantial 
rehabilitation, require individual examination to determine 
whether the requisite state action can be established under 
either approach. 
A. State Involvement in the Section 8 Program 
The state involvement approach, exemplified by Burton 
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 40 identifies points of 
contact between the state and the private individual. In 
Burton, the Court held that the exclusion of a black customer 
from the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, operated by a private owner 
under a lease in a parking building financed by public funds 
and owned by the parking authority, an agency of the State of 
Delaware, constituted discriminatory state action. The 
parking authority entered into its lease with the restaurant to 
ensure the parking facility's financial success. The Court 
concluded that the financial interdependence between Eagle 
and the Authority made them joint participants in the 
discrimination: 
The state has so far insinuated itself into a 
position of interdependence with Eagle that it 
must be recognized as a joint participant in the 
challenged activity, which, on that account, 
cannot be considered to have been so purely 
private as to fall without the scope of the 14th 
Amendment. 4 1 
More recently.the Supreme Court in Moose Lodge No. 
107 v. Jrvis42 and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 43 
without explicitly overruling Burton, has defined a more 
stringent standard of state action necessary to trigger 
fourteenth amendment protections. In Moose Lodge the 
Court applied a balancing approach to state action by 
comparing competing private interests with the state's 
governmental obligations. The plaintiff, a black guest of a 
lodge member, was denied service at a fraternal club which 
38. See. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967), "This 
Court has never attempted the 'impossible task' of formu-
lating an infallible test for determining whether the State ... 
has become significantly involved in private discrimination." 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 
(1961), "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances 
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private 
conduct be attributed its true significance." See generally. 
Van Alstyne and Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 
(1961); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for State Action, 
30 S.CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957). 
39. See general~'" Note, State Action: Theories for Applying 
Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 CAL. 
L.REV. 656 (1974). 
40. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
41. Id. at 725. 
42. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
43. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
4 
held a state liquor license. Liquor licensing was held 
insufficient to implicate the state because the state regulations 
did not explicitly sanction the discrimination and could not 
therefore overcome defendant's "associational" interests. Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, maintained that 
the crucial factor was that Moose Lodge was a "private social 
club in a private building." thus distinguishing Moose Lodge 
from Burton. Moose Lodge may therefore restrict the type of 
evidence that can be relied upon to establish a joint venture 
under Burton to places of public accommodation which are 
physically located within publicly owned facilities. 44 Whether 
Burton is so severely limited to its special fact setting is not 
entirely clear; however, such a conclusion is further suggested 
by dicta in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison which limits 
Burton's application to lessees of public property.4S 
In Jackson, Metropolitan Edison, a heavily regulated 
private utility which enjoyed a territorial monopoly for the 
provision of electricity, terminated service to Catherine 
Jackson's home for nonpayment of bills. Jackson claimed that 
termination without adequate notice and a hearing before an 
impartial body. deprived her of property without due process 
of law. The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, rejected the claim 
that the termination constituted state action, even though the 
utility had included the termination procedures in its required 
general tariff filings with the state public utilities commission. 
In support of its holding, the Court noted that it was not 
evident that the procedures had to be included in the filings, 
nor. was it clear that the commission had the authority to 
disapprove them. Although the state had reviewed the tariff 
and had routinely "approved" it by not disapproving within 60 
days after filing, the particular termination procedures had 
never been the subject of hearings or investigation. 46 Justice 
Rehnquist went on to observe that without such specific 
consideration, even approval might not be sufficient to 
transform private action into state action: 
Approval by a state utility commission of such 
a request from a regulated utility, where the 
Commission has not put its own weight on the 
side of the proposed practice by ordering it, 
does not transmute a practice initiated by the 
utility and approved by the Commission into 
"state action. "47 
The Court therefore suggests, in apparent disregard of prior 
decisions, that the critical question is not how the regulatory 
scheme allocates decision-making power, but where it places 
the initiative. 48 
44. See Burke and Reber, State Action, Congressional Power 
and Creditor's Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 46 S.CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1050. 
45. 419 U.S. at 358 (1974). It could be argued that the Section 
8 existing housing rental unit is "quasi-public" property 
due to the fact that the landlord contracts with the PHA to 
accept partial rent from the tenant in return for guaranteed 
payments from the PHA which make up the rest of the fair 
market value of the unit. 
46. Id. at 355. 
47. Id. at 357. 
48. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 
147 ( 1975); see also Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Pre-
liminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 355-357 (1976). 
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In addition, although the private utility was in effect a 
government protected monopoly, such status did not 
transform the termination procedures into state action. The 
Court held that not only must there be a close nexus between 
the state and the challenged entity, but also a "sufficiently close 
nexus between the state and the challenged action of the 
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly 
treated as that of the State itself. " 49 Thus, a finding of state 
action must be based on a finding that the state is closely 
involved in the challenged activity itself. 
Reading these cases together and applying them to 
Section 8 evictions, it is apparent that tc establish state 
involvement requires more than the identity of points of 
contact between the state and the private landlord. The state 
activity must be something more than what was seen in Moose 
Lodge to be passive regulation of an essentially private 
relationship. To meet the strict requirements of Jackson, it 
must be shown that there is a close nexus between the state and 
the eviction of the Section 8 tenant. Alternatively, if it can be 
shown that the state has ordered the eviction or has overtly or 
covertly encouraged it,5o state action may be established. 
The public and federally subsidized housing cases that 
have discussed the problem of state action all preceded 
Jackson. With the exception of the Montana Supreme 
Court, 51 each of the courts that have considered the issue have 
found sufficient contracts between the state and the PHA or 
private landlord to establish jurisdiction and to trigger the 
protections of the due process clause. 52 Although many of 
those courts blended the discussion of state and federal 
involvement, it is important to keep the two conceptually 
distinct for analysis purposes. 
Federal involvement may be shown for the purpose of 
establishing fifth amendment governmental action. The 
Section 8 program clearly involves the federal government: 
Congress enacted the legislation; fiUD has issued extensive 
regulations53 and is responsible for the day-to-day 
administration of the program including sueh duties as 
allocation of funds, 54 evaluation of applications, 55 contracting 
responsibility,56 setting fair market rent limits,57 and general 
supervision of programs. However, since the requirements of 
Jackson presumably could be extended to fifth amendment 
governmental action as well as to fourteenth amendment state 
action, merely showing points of contact between the federal 
49. 419 U.S. at 351 (1974). 
50. Id. at 357 n. 17. 
51. Flamm v. Real-BLT, Inc., 543 P.2d 190 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 
1975), cer1. denied 424 U.S. 1313 (1976). Although this 
subsidized housing case was decided after Jackson, the 
Montana Court did not cite Jackson in its opinion. On 
application for a stay of judgment, Justice Rehnquist, acting 
as circuit justice, noted that in view of the express pro-
vision of the lease allowing termination by either party on 
30-day advance notice, four justices of the Court would not 
grant certiorari, finding it unnecessary to reach the con-
stitutional question. 
52. See supra note 22. 
53. See supra notes 29-32. 
54. See 24 C.F.R. §§880.201, 881.201, 882.201, and 886.103; 
886.202. 
55. See 24 C.F.R. §§880.2!0, 881.210, 882.205, and 886.!07. 
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b). 
57. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(c). 
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government and the program may be insufficient. Thus a 
sufficiently close relationship between both the federal 
government and the private owner, and the federal 
government and the eviction itself may be required. 
For purposes of jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act 
or the fourteenth amendment, state or local governmental 
involvement must be established. 58 Of course, under Jackson, 
there must be state or local government involvement in the 
eviction by the private landlord. The following discussion 
focuses primarily on an identification of the nexus between the 
Section 8 subprograms and state or local government 
sufficient to establish fourteenth amendment state action. 
(1) Existing Housing 
Establishing state action under the Section 8 existing 
housing program59 presents no major problem because the 
PHA administers the program. HUD is limited by statute to 
contracting with PHAs for administration of the existing 
housing prngram or to performing the functions of a PHA 
directly where no PHA exists. 60 A public housing agency is 
defined by HUD as "any state, county, municipality or other 
governmental entity or public body (or agency or 
instrumentality thereoO which is authorized to engage in or 
assist in the development or operation of housing for low-
income families. "61 Because of this direct involvement by the 
PHA, the existing housing program should not be subject to 
the requirements of Jackson, a case involving indirect 
government involvement by a state regulatory commission. 
If the question arises, however, the structure of the 
existing housing program also fulfills the stricter state action 
nexus required for indirect government involvement. The 
following description of the application process outlines both 
the points of contact between the Section 8 private owner and 
state and local government and the PH A's connection with the 
eviction. 
Before the PH A receives contract authorization for 
existing units, it must make an application to HUD. Each 
HUD field office allocates the number of units available for 
existing housing based on the Local Housing Assistance Plan 
(HAP). 62 Invitations then issue to the local PHA, governor of 
the state, and chief executive officers of the counties, 
municipalities or other public bodies authorized to operate 
low-income housing. 63 When screening applications, HUD 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
See supra note 28. 
In the first years of the program, HUD displayed a pre-
ference for channeling program activity into existing rather 
than new housing. For a discussion of this pattern, see 
Senate Report to Accompany S.3295 (Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs Committee) No. 94-749, April 12, 1976, at 3. 
42 u.s.c. §1437f(b)(I). 
24 C.F. R. §882. !02. 
Each community. as a prerequisite to receiving a community 
development block grant under §104(a)(4) of the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1974, must prepare a 
housing assistance plan which assesses the housing needs 
of lower-income persons. :rhe allocation of Section 8 funds 
is also subject to the fair share requirements of §212. See 
42 u.s.c. § 1439. 
24 C.F.R. §882.203. 
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must send a copy of each application to the local government 
in which the proposed program is to be carried out, 64 and 
invite a response which is considered during the application 
evaluation by HUD. 65 Although the final decision is HUD's, 
inconsistency with the local HAP is allowed only in 
exceptional circumstances. 66 
Once the PHA is allocated units, it is responsible for 
inviting participation by owners67 and determining family 
eligibility prior to issuance of a Certificate of Family 
Participation. 68 The PHA explains the program to the family 69 
and upon request assists families in locating units. 70 The PHA 
approves the lease between the owner and tenant7 1 and makes 
an initial and annual inspection of the unit. 72 It also has 
ongoing responsibility for reexamination of family income. 73 
In addition to the above PHA responsibilities, and most 
important to the issue of state action, the statute expressly 
provides that the PH A shall have the sole right to give notice to 
vacate, with the owner having the right to ask the agency for 
termination of tenancy. 74 As interpreted by HUD 
regulations, 75 however, the owner gives the family notice of the 
proposed eviction subject to authorization by the PHA. The 
PHA must authorize the eviction unless it finds the grounds 
insufficient under the lease. If the PHA makes no finding, or 
does not give notice of its determination within 20 days, the 
PHA is deemed to have authorized the eviction. According to 
the regulations, Section 8 existing housing leases may provide 
for termination of tenancy upon a 30-day notice. 76 
Unfortunately, where applicable, it has been interpreted by 
many PHAs to authorize an eviction without good cause. 
The Moose Lodge decision should not prevent a finding 
of state action in an eviction from Section 8 existing housing; 
the "business" relationship between a Section 8 landlord and 
tenant can be distinguished from the social relationships 
among members of a private club. Furthermore, as detailed 
above, a PHA assumes a much more active role in the Section 
8 program than that performed by the state liquor licensing 
agency in Moose Lodge. 
The eviction of a low income tenant by a Section 8 
landlord also meets both of the tests set forth in Jackson. First, 
the requirement of a close nexus between the state and the 
challenged entity has been met by the significant contacts 
between the private Section 8 landlord and the PHA. A close 
nexus between the state and the challenged activity is directly 
established by PHA approval of the lease and by its 
64. 24 C.F.R. §882.205(b). 
65. 24 C.F.R. §882.205(c). 
66. Congress reaffirmed the requirement of consistency with 
the local HAP in Pub.L. No. 94-375, containing recent 
amendments to Section 8. See House Conference Report No. 
94-1304 to Accompany S.3295, Joint Explanatory Statement 
of the Committee of Conference (June 25, 1976). 
67. 24 C.F.R. §882.208. 
68. 24 C.F.R. §882.209. 
69. 24 C.F.R. §882.209. 
70. 24 C.F.R. §882.103. 
71. 24 C. F. R. §882.2 IO. 
72. 24 C.F.R. §882.21 l(b). 
73. 24 C.F.R. §882.212. 
74. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(d)(l)(B). 
75. 24 C.F.R. §882.215. 
76. 24 C.F.R. §882.107. 
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authorization of the ev1ct1on by the Section 8 landlord. 
Second, because the Section 8 statute specifically reserves the 
right to give notice to vacate to the PHA (or to HUD if acting 
as a PHA where none exists), the PHA is placed in the position 
of ordering each individual eviction. Even under HUD 
regulations which allow private owners to give notice to vacate 
subject to PH A authorization, the PHA retains final approval 
authority over all evictions in existing housing. 
On the other hand, an argument against a finding of state 
involvement may be based on the contention that the PHA is 
not sufficiently involved in the eviction so that the eviction by a 
private landlord may be fairly treated as that of the PHA itself. 
According to HUD regulations, a PHA may "authorize" an 
eviction through inaction. This procedure is similar to the 
public utility commission's routine "approval" by not 
disapproving, which was found insufficient to constitute state 
action in Jackson. Since the private landlord would be the 
logical party to initiate any eviction process, the PHA does not 
really order or encourage any eviction which is against the 
landlord's will. Based on the policy of encouraging private 
participation in the Section 8 program, the lease between the 
landlord and tenant should therefore govern the relationship. 
On balance, the above argument should not preclude a 
finding of state involvement in a Section 8 existing housing 
eviction case because of the PH A's responsibility for evictions 
mandated by the statute itself. Although the owner has the 
right to ask the agency for termination of tenancy, the PHA 
has the sole right to give notice to vacate, and therefore is 
ultimately responsible for termination of tenancies in existing 
housing. Even though HUD regulations may result in passive 
PHA approval of owner-initiated evictions, the regulations 
should not be interpreted to allow PHAs to circumvent the 
clear intent of the statute. If so, PH As would be cooperating 
with and possibly encouraging arbitrary evictions by Section 8 
landlords. 77 
In addition, under the Section 8 regulations, the PHA is 
required to examine the grounds for each individual eviction 78 
rather than merely passing on general eviction procedures. 
This factor alone should distinguish the PHA Section 8 
eviction authorization from the tariff approval .by the public 
utility commission in Jackson. v 
In conclusion, PH A responsibility for evictions 
combined with the additional factor of the direct contractual 
relationship between the PHA and the private landlord 
(providing for cash payments to the landlord), should 
sufficiently distinguish Section 8 evictions from the Jackson 
termination of electric service situation to justify a finding of 
state action even if the PHA is seen to be indirectly involved in 
the eviction. 
(2) New Construction and Substantial 
Rehabilitation 
Finding the requisite state action is more d!fficult for the 
new construction and substantial rehabilitation 79 component 
77. See supra. note 26. 
78. 24 C.F.R. §882.215. 
79. The relevant regulations for Section 8 new construction and 
substantial rehabilitation are virtually identical. 
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of Section 8 because unlike existing housing, the PHA is not 
required to send the notice to vacate and to authorize the 
eviction. In fact, the PHA is not involved in any phase of the 
eviction process; it is the owner who is responsible for 
termination of tenancy. Bo 
The owner must follow specific eviction procedures, 
however, if he intends to receive benefits for the unit during 
any period of vacancy, not exceeding 60 days, resulting from 
the eviction. Bl This is a critical requirement for most owners 
because the feasibility of their projects is dependent upon 
continuing Section 8 benefits and the need to collect full fair 
market value for each unit. Although the vacancy period 
payments regulation requires the owner to certify that the 
eviction was not made in violation of the lease and that proper 
notice was given to the tenant, HUD has not implemented an 
enforcement mechanism and must rely upon such certification 
by the owner. In reality, therefore, the requirement offers little 
protection to tenants. 
Evictions from new construction and substantial 
rehabilitation units have not been a widespread problem to 
date because very little housing construction was 
accomplished during the beginning of the Section 8 program. B2 
This situation presumably will change, with a consequent 
heightening of the program's importance to tenants, as the 
program developsBJ and the demand for new low income 
housing increases. The most recent HUD projections show an 
increased emphasis on new construction and rehabilitation. B4 
Due to the structure of the new construction and 
substantial rehabilitation programs, an examination of 
government involvement should include an analysis of federal 
involvement for the purpose of making a fifth amendment 
governmental action showing as well as an analysis of state or 
local involvement for fourteenth amendment purposes. The 
following discussion first examines the possibility of making a 
fourteenth amendment state action showing. 
The amount of state involvement present will vary 
according to ownership of the units, the parties to the Housing 
80. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(e)(2) and 24 C.F.R. §§880.220 and 
881.220. 
81. 24 C.F.R. §§880.107 and 88i. I07. 
82. In the first one and one half years after enactment, Section 
8 produced a total of 2,600 units, most of which were 
merely conversions from an earlier HUD program. Jn com-
parison, under the first calendar year of operation for 
Section 236 and Section 235, mortgages for 77 projects with 
11,800 units were insured under Section 236, and 24,400 
units were insured under Section 235. See, Senate Report 
to Accompany S.3295 (Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee) No. 94-749, April 12, 1976, at 4. 
83. An obstacle to obtaining financing for new construction, 
the 60-day limit for assistance payments when vacancies 
occur, has now been removed by an amendment which 
allows vacancy payments for up to one year. See Housing 
Authorization Act of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-375 (S.3295), 
August 3, 1976. For a general discussion of the Section 8 
financing limitations before the amendment, see, Halperin 
and Brenner, Opportunities Under the New Section 8 
Housing Program, 6 REAL EST. REV. 70 (Spring 1976). 
84. Preliminary HUD reports indicate that 103,431 units were 
started during the 1977 fiscal yea., ending September 30, 
1977. See HUD NEWSLETTER, Vol. 8, No. 45 (Nov. 7, 
1977). See supra note 35. 
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Assistance Contract and the method of financing the new 
construction or substantial rehabilitation. PHA ownership 
would clearly involve state action, and since good cause 
eviction standards already apply to PHA-owned Section 8 
units, no further discussion of PHA ownership is needed. BS In 
cases in which the PHA joins with a private ownerB6 to 
construct units, state involvement may be found under a 
Burton joint venture theory. For all other cases involving a 
private owner contracting directly with HUD, state 
involvement will rest on the involvement of local government 
in the application process, in most cases not a substantial 
connection, and in the method used to finance the project. 
Local involvement in the application process as required 
by the regulations is very similar to that required under the 
existing housing program. HUD must forward Preliminary 
Proposals to the chief executive officer of the unit of local 
government in which the project would be located, inviting 
response within 30 days.B7 The local officers may object on the 
grounds of inconsistency with an approved Housing 
Assistance Plan (HAP). HUD must rule within 30 days of the 
locality's claim.BB In addition, the proposal must be reviewed 
by an A-95 ClearinghouseB9 in which the county or regional 
government's comments may be added. 90 Nevertheless, as in 
existing housing, HUD makes the final determination. 
The method of financing used by the private developer 
therefore becomes crucial. Privately financed units may 
receive Housing Assistance Payments Contracts of up to only 
20 years.91 Contracts for projects financed by a loan or loan 
guarantee from a state or local agency or the Farmers Home 
Administration 92 may be made for up to 40 years. 93 The 40-
year contract makes it much more desirable for private 
developers to seek state-aided financing. 94 Such involvement 
of the state may be the key to finding state action in privately-
owned projects. 
If the project was financed by a loan or loan guarantee 
from a state or local agency, state involvement may be found 
85. See 24 C.F.R. §§866 et seq. 
86. 24 C.F.R. §§880.!02, 880.106, 880.121, 881.102, 881.106 and 
881.121. The project is owned by the private developer, but 
the Housing Assistance Contract is entered into by the 
private owner and the PHA subject to an Annual Contribu-
tions Contract between HUD and the PHA. 
87. 24 C.F.R. §§880.208(b) and 881.208(b). 
88. 24 C.F.R. §§880.208(b)(2) and 881.208(b). 
89. 24 C.F.R. §880.208(b)(I). 
90. Local approval of rent supplements included as a factor in 
finding state action in FHA housing cases. See, e.g., Joy 
v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973). 
91. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(e)(l) (Supp. 1977). 
92. There is substantial similarity between the Farmers Home 
Administration §515 program and §236 subsidized housing 
program, the maj_or difference being that §515 is a direct 
loan program rather than an interest reduction program. 
A very strong argument therefore can be made that the good 
cause eviction regulations which apply to Section 8 assisted 
§236 projects should also apply to §515 projects receiving 
Section 8 assistance. See 24 C.F.R. §450.2(e)(4). 
93. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(e)(l) (Supp. 1977). 
94. See Ross, Finding a Way to Finance Section 8 New Con-
struction, 7 J. HOUSING 309 (July 1976). 
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on a state aid theory, 9s particularly if the agency has approved 
the lease allowing eviction without good cause. 96 (n addition to 
financing assistance, other special assistance may have been 
granted the project by state or local government such as tax 
breaks, 97 zoning variances, or buy-back arrangements with a 
redevelopment authority. Similar privileges were instrumental 
in the finding of state involvement in McQueen v. Drucker, 98 a 
§22 l(d)(3) eviction case. 
In the case of participation in the Section 8 program by 
State Housing Finance and Development Agencies 
(H FDA), 99 state involvement may be found in both the state's 
utilization of the new construction/substantial rehabilitation 
program and in its administration of the special "set-aside" 
program.'°0 In the HFDA set-aside program, HUD contracts 
with the State Housing Finance and Development Agency to 
act as a miniature HUD within the state. The state HFDA then 
implements state housing policy through use of the Section 8 
housing assistance program. Developers apply directly to the 
state HFDA for Section 8 housing assistance payments. 
Through participation in this program, owners may be subject 
to the state H FDA requirements. For example, in California, a 
good cause eviction standard and hearing procedure has been 
established by statute for California Housing Finance Agency 
housing sponsors.101 Thus HFDA involvement is important 
95. The state aid theory as applied to a finding of governmental 
action in FHA subsidized housing is exemplified by Joy v. 
Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); McClellan v. Uni-
versity Heights, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 374 (D. R.I. 1972). But 
see, McGuane v. Chenango Court, 431 F.2d 1189, 1190 
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (receipt of 
federal mortgage benefits not sufficient to establish state 
action); Wilson v. Lincoln Redevelopment Corp., 488 F.2d 
339 (8th Cir. 1973). 
96. State aid may not be enough after Moose Lodge and 
Jackson. For a case which required approval of challenged 
activity by the governmental agency giving aid, see Greco v. 
Orange Memorial Hospital, 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied. 423 U.S. IOOO ( 1975) (no state action where 
a private hospital which prohibited abortion was operated 
in a building leased from the county for $1 per year, where 
the county had neither interfered with nor sought to in-
fluence the hospital's abortion policy.) 
97. A lower real estate tax assessment for a §236 housing 
project was held no( sufficient in itself to establish state 
action in Weigand v. Afton View Apts., 473 F.2d 545, 
547-548 (3rd Cir. 1973); but cf, Jackson v. Statler Founda-
tion, 496 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1974); Comment, Tax Benefits 
Coriferred on Private Charitable Foundation May Amount 
to 'State Action' - Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 49 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 578 (1974). 
98. 317 F.Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), affd 438 F.2d 781 (1st 
Cir. 1971 ); see also, Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469 
F.2d 616, 620-622 (2d Cir. 1972) (private housing in urban 
renewal area cannot arbitrarily refuse to rent to welfare 
recipients); Colon v. Tomkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 
F.Supp. 134, 137 (S.D. N.Y. 1968). 
99. For a description of the origin of State Housing Finance 
Agencies, see Development of State Housing Finance 
Agencies, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. and TRUST J. 471 
(1974'). 
100. 24 C.F.R. §§883, et seq. Note exceptions described in 24 
C.F.R. §§883.105, 883.106 and 883.107. 
101. CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §41400 
(West Supp. 1977). 
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because it facilitates a state action showing and also may be 
significant because of particularly favorable eviction 
requirements. 
An alternative argument for state involvement in an 
eviction from new construction or substantial rehabilitation 
units derives from use of state judicial procedures to enforce 
the "unconstitutional" eviction. In She/(11 v. Kraemer, 102 the 
Supreme Court ruled that judicial enforcement of private 
agreements containing restrictive covenants against selling to 
blacks constituted state action and violated the equal 
protection clause.103 However, the application of this case to 
Section 8 evictions may find little support in the lower 
courts.104 Through the years most courts have felt constrained 
to limit the application of Shel(v to race discrimination 
situations or to transactions between willing parties which are 
threatened by discriminatory judicial intervention. 
The state judicial enforcement argument possibly could 
be used as an added indicant of state involvement, rather than 
as an alternative theory. Several courts have listed the 
utilization of state judicial eviction procedures as a factor in 
finding state action in FHA subsidized housing evictions.1os 
Nevertheless, since Jackson, it is highly uncertain whether 
relevant, but not sufficient, factors may be aggregated to 
support a finding of state action.106 
In summary, although many points of contact exist 
between state and local government and the Section 8 new 
construction and substantial rehabilitation program, it is more 
difficult to show state involvement in the eviction itself. Unless 
a state or local agency has approved a lease which allows 
termination of the tenancy without good cause or specifically 
requires certain eviction procedures, Jackson may well 
preclude a finding of fourteenth amendment state action in 
evictions from new construction and substantial rehabilitation 
program Section 8 units. 
Fifth amendment government action, however, can be 
demonstrated through two aspects of HUD's administration 
of the new construction and substantial rehabilitation 
programs. First, HUD itself has issued eviction regulations 
which give the owner control over termination of tenancies. 
102. 334 U.S. I (1948). 
103. See, e.g.. Henkin, Shel(1• v. Kraemer: Notes for a Re-
vised Opinion. 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Lewis, 
The Meaning of State Action. 60 COLUM. L. REV. J083, 
I J08-l I 20 (1960; Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial 
Integrity: A Rep(1• to Professor Wechsler, I08 U. PA. L. 
REV. I (1959); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I, 29 (1959). 
104. See LaVoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972) (zoning 
laws place mobile home park in favorable economic position, 
thereby making state eviction proceedings state action). But 
compare. Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F.Supp. 1218, 1225-6 
(S.D. N. Y. 1970) with Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 
F. Supp. 501, 506 (S.D. N.Y. 1967) (finding of state a!'tion 
in use of eviction procedures depends on landlord's motive 
in evicting tenant). 
I05. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson 
v. Den,ny, 365 F.Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973). 
I06. See dissent by Justice Douglas, in Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison, 419 U.S. at 360 !1974), see also, Antoun, State 
Action: Judicial Perpetuation of the State/ Prfrate Dis-
tinction. 2 OHIO NORTH L. REV. 722, 729-730 (1975). 
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Although HUD originally made the subsidized housing good 
cause eviction regulations applicable to Section 8, 107 it 
changed its policy upon promulgation of the final regulations 
to exclude Section 8. The reason given for the change was the 
General Counsel's opinion that the owner should be vested 
with the fullest degree of management responsibility and that, 
in the absence of a court decision construing the statute 
differently, HUD should exclude Section 8 new construction 
and substantial rehabilitation units from the good cause 
eviction requirements.108 HUD thus limited the application of 
the regulations to those housing programs which courts had 
already held to be subject to a good cause eviction standard. 
Through its consideration of the question, HUD made a 
definite decision about eviction procedures. Under the 
reasoning in Jackson, 109 action in compliance with the 
regulations which results in an arbitrary eviction by a private 
owner therefore may be transformed into action by the federal 
government. 
Second, if the owner applies for vacancy period benefits 
after an eviction, more significant federal involvement can be 
shown through the requirement of owner certification that 
proper notice was given and that the eviction did not violate 
the lease. 11 0 Thus, HUD prescribes the method of eviction 
when vacancy payments are made. If the owner has acted 
arbitrarily and is receiving vacancy payments, HUD is placed 
in the position of encouraging arbitrary actions. Such 
encouragement arguably constitutes governmental action 
sufficient to trigger fifth amendment due process protections. 
Although the Supreme Court has not held the 
requirements of Jackson to be·applicable to fifth amendment 
governmental action, the Jackson standard is likely to be 
applied by lower courts to the Section 8 new construction or 
substantial rehabilitation eviction situation.'" If so, recent 
mortgage foreclosure cases 112 in which courts have refused to 
find governmental action in non-judicial foreclosures 
involving the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA) should be distinguished. 
In Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 113 the Fifth Circuit 
held that no sufficient nexu~ existed to transform a private 
mortgagee's act in exercising its right of private foreclosure 
sale into that of the federal government with respect to a 
federally assisted low income housing mortgage. The decision 
107. See proposed 24 C.F.R. §450 in 41 Fed. Reg. 16922 
(April 22, 1976) (applicability of proposed good cause 
eviction regulations to Section 8 was limited to termination 
of occupancy by the landlord prior to the end of a term, 
see §450.5). 
108. See introductory comments to final regulations published in 
41 Fed. Reg. 43329, 43330 (Sept. 30, 1976). 
109. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. at 357 (1974). 
I IO. See 24 C.F.R. §§880.!07 and 881. i07. 
11 i. It could be argued that a less stringent standard should be 
applied to trigger fifth amendment due process protection 
due to the relative lack of interference with the state. 
Difficulties with values of federalism would be significantly 
less than in a fourteenth amendment situation. See gener-
alb·. Burke and Reber, supra at IOl2. 
112. Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 
1977); Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 
527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975). 
113. 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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is premised on a determination that the FNMA is a "private" 
entity and that the terms of the mortgage should govern the 
relationship between the parties. Even though HUD exercises 
some control over FNMA, including provision of the standard 
deed of trust form used by FNMA, HU D's regulation was held 
insufficient to establish that the government was involved in 
the activity which caused the injury.114 
It can be argued that Roberts is wrongly decided because 
of the court's failure to acknowledge the distinction between a 
FNMA mortgage created by the g9vernment and a mortgage 
created by private parties. This distinction should differentiate 
the FNMA mortgage foreclosure case and the Section 8 
eviction case from the Jackson termination of electric service 
by a pfivate utility. The crux of the Roberts case and the main 
criticism of it therefore lies in its treatment of the FNMA as a 
purely nongovernmental entity. 
Without attacking the basis of the decision, however, 
Roberts can be distinguished from the Section 8 eviction 
situation even though the regulatory relationship between 
HUD and FNMA, and HUD and the new construction or 
substantial rehabilitation private owner is very similar. 1 is For 
example, if the Section 8 owner wishes to apply for vacancy 
benefits, HUD prescribes the method of eviction and requires 
owner certification of compliance, requirements which go 
beyond the provisions in the standard lease form. The vacancy 
payments situation is therefore different from a FNMA 
foreclosure pursuant to standard deed of trust provisions 
because of H UD's more specific prescription of procedures in 
the eviction case. 
Furthermore, the Section 8 owner continues to receive 
benefits after the eviction not only in the vacancy payments 
situation, but also when the unit is rented to another low 
income tenant. The continuing involvement of the private 
owner in the program is ensured by the five year housing 
assistance payments contract, subject to renewal for up to 20 
years. In contrast, after FNMA forecloses in a Section 235 
homeowner situation, FNMA involvement with the housing 
unit comes to an end. Unlike the foreclosure situation, 
therefore, the Section 8 eviction occurs during the period of a 
continuing relationship between HUD and the owner of the 
unit. 
In conclusion, although it is more difficult to establish 
the requisite state or governmental action in the new 
construction and substantial rehabilitation programs, Jackson 
should not preclude a finding of fourteenth amendment state 
action if the private owner receives state or local agency 
assistance in financing and if the agency has approved the 
eviction procedures or the lease used by the landlord. 
Alternatively, fifth amendment governmental action can be 
demonstrated, particularly if the owner utilized the 60-day 
vacancy period prov1s1on, through HUD's specific 
prescription of eviction procedures and certification of 
compliance by the owner. 
B. Section 8 and the Public Function Approach 
to State Action 
Finding state action or governmental action under the 
114. Id. at 359. 
115. See genera/~1· 24 C.F.R. §§203 et seq. 
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public function approach requires that the activity performed 
by the private entity be so clearly governmental in nature that 
the state cannot be permitted to escape responsibility. The 
challenged private activity may be identified as state action if 
the private entity acts in form, power, and tradition like the 
government. 
The public function concept first developed from 
political party primary election cases, 116 and received its classic 
statement in Marsh v. Alabama.111 Marsh involved the 
prosecution of a Jehovah's Witness who refused to leave the 
business district sidewalk of a town owned by a ship-building 
company. The town had "all the characteristics of any other 
American town"11s and replaced the state by performing a 
spectrum of municipal services. 119 After balancing property 
rights against freedom of press and religion, the Supreme 
Court determined that property rights do not "justify the 
State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of 
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the 
enforcement of such restraint by application of a State 
statute." 120 The Burger Court has qualified the public function 
concept in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., by applying 
the test of whether the power exercised by the utility company 
was one "traditionally associated with sovereignty," such as 
eminent domain.121 
Under a fifth amendment governmental action analysis, 
it can be argued that a Section 8 private developer is acting like 
the federal government in the provision of low income 
housing. Since the United States Housing Act of 1937, 122 the 
federal government has been involved in the goal of providing 
decent, safe, and sanitary housing for low and moderate 
income families. To achieve that object, statutes provide that 
the federal government shall provide assistance to private 
enterprise to meet the need.123 These factors have supported a 
finding of governmental action based on the public function 
116. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (fifteenth amend-
ment forbids exclusion of blacks from primary election 
conducted by the Democratic Party of Texas, pursuant to a 
party resolution); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) 
(fifteenth amendment forbids exclusion of blacks from "pre-
primary" elections of an all-white organization run like a 
regular political party and whose candidates since 1889 had 
nearly always run unopposed and won in the regular Demo-
cratic primary). 
117. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
118. Id. at 502. 
119. For an expansion of the public function concept, see Evans 
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (a private park which had 
been used as a public facility exhibited a predominant 
municipal character and purpose and therefore was treated 
as a public institution regardless of who held title under 
state Jaw). 
120. 326 U.S. at 509 (1946). 
121. 419 U.S. at 353 (1974). 
122. 42 U.S.C. §1437a. The term low income families is defined 
to mean families who "cannot afford to pay enough to 
cause private enterprise in their locality or metropolitan 
area to build an adequate supply of decent, safe, and san-
itary dwellings for their use." 
123. See 42 U.S.C. §§1441(2) and 1441a (Supp. 1977). 
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approach in FHA subsidized housing cases.124 Although FHA 
cases were decided previous to Jackson, the fact that the 
federal government has traditionally been involved in the 
provision of low income housing and that the Section 8 
landlord is acting to further that goal within a statutory 
scheme should serve to distinguish the Section 8 landlord from 
the Jackson situation. 
It is more difficult to establish traditional involvement in 
the provision of low income housing by state or local 
governments sufficient to establish fourteenth amendment 
state action. Under the existing housing program, public 
housing agencies perform a state function, as established by 
state enabling statutes, 12s through the provision oflow income 
housing. Although PHAs administer the Section 8 existing 
housing program, private owners perform many functions 
traditionally assigned to local PHAs under previous federal 
housing programs such as conventional public housing and 
Section 23 leased housing. For example, owners select tenants, 
maintain the units, and perform management functions 
previously perfomled by the local housing agency. Under the 
Section 8 program, the local governmental unit derives the 
benefit from not having to perform these functions in addition 
to the added tax revenue o!>tained from utilizing "private 
units" to house its low income tenants. 126 Because the landlord 
performs functions similar in form, power and tradition to 
PHA responsibilities under the conventioqal public housing 
program and the Section 23 existing housing program, it can 
be argued that the state should not be permitted to escape 
responsibility simply because its functions are performed by 
the private landlord in the Section 8 existing housing program. 
Under the new construction and substantial 
rehabilitation program, it can be argued that the private owner 
performs a state function through the provision of new low 
income housing. The proposed housing must be consistent 
with the local HAP and receive approval from local political 
bodies. Construction of housing units for rental to low income 
families may be considered a public function more readily if 
the Section 8 private developer has applied to a state housing 
finance agency for financing or for a housing assistance 
payments contract than without state involvement 12i on the 
124. For example, Anderson v. Denny. 365 F.Supp. 1254 (W.D. 
Va. 1973); McClellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 
374 (D. R.I. 1972); Appel v. Beyer, 39 Cal.App.3dSupp. 7, 
114 Cal.Rptr. 336 (1974). 
J 25. Enabling legislation exists in all 50 states. The powers 
granted to local housing authorities are usually all those 
necessary and appropriate to provide for low income dwell-
ings and to clear slums, such as the power to lease, sell 
and construct housing, the power tt> sell bonds and to con-
tract with the federal government for financial assistance, 
and the power of eminent domain. For example, CAL. 
HEAL TH & SAFETY CODE, §§34310, 34312 and 34315 
(West 1973). 
126. Conventional public housing requires local government to 
exempt public housing from property taxes. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 141 O(h). Leased housing properties remain on local tax 
rolls. See Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Progress Report of Federal Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Programs. 9Jst Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1970). 
127. See generally California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott, 
17 C.3d 575, 131 Cal.Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193 (1976). 
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theory that the state should not be allowed to use private 
owners to violate tenants' rights when prohibited from such 
activity itself. 
On the other hand, although provision of housing may 
be a function which is public in nature, it is not traditionally an 
exclusive state function. 128 Most housing is provided by the 
private sector, with private individuals making judgments 
about tenant selection and eviction subject to general state law. 
Therefore, provision of housing may not fall into the category 
of a power like "eminent domain" which is exercised 
exclusively by the state. 
Resolution of the conflicting arguments regarding 
applicability of the public function concept to Section 8 will 
depend on the courts' interpretation of the function 
performed. If the court is willing to accept the formulation that 
Section 8 provides decent housing to low and very low income 
persons who otherwise could not afford it, and that the cost of 
new housing has made provision of new low income housing 
an exclusive state function, then the public function approach 
may provide an alternative way to establish state action. If the 
court determines that the landlord is merely providing housing 
to a general market, then the public function concept will not 
be very helpful to tenants because the activity must be a 
function of the state, not merely clothed with the public 
interest.129 
In summary, under the public function approach, fifth 
amendment government action may be more easily established 
because of the federal government's more visible traditional 
role in the provision of low income housing. An argument for 
fourteenth amendment state action may be made for existing 
housing on the basis of the private owner's performance of a 
traditional PHA role. For new construction and substantial 
rehabilitation, the success of the public function argument 
depends upon a court's willingness to look to provision of new 
low income housing as the function performed rather than 
merely provision of housing to a general market. 
Ill. ESTABLISHMENT OF A DUE PROCESS 
GOOD CAUSE EVICTION STANDARD 
The presence of "state action" does not in itself result in 
the application of the due process good cause eviction 
standard. i30 It is merely a first step. Section 8 tenants must 
show two additional factors: entitlement to the continued 
occupancy of the assisted units, and the appropriateness of the 
requested good cause hearing procedure. 
A. Tenants' Entitlement to Continued Occupancy 
in Section 8 Units 
The concept of entitlement to government benefits 
128. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
129. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. at 353 (1974). 
130. For an excellent discussion of due process protection for 
tenants in FHA subsidized housing, see Comment, Pro-
cedural Due Process in Government Subsidized Housing, 
86 HARV. L. REV. 880 (1973). For discussion of pro-
cedural due process issues for Section 8, see Note, The New 
Leased Housing Program: How Tenantable A Proposition?" 
26 HASTING L. J. 1145 (1975). 
131. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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received the Supreme Court's imprimatur in the landmark case 
of Goldberg v. Kelly. i31 In Goldberg, the petitioner claimed 
that termination of her welfare benefits without a prior hearing 
was a denial of due process. Rejecting the categorization of 
welfare benefits as a privilege rather than a right, the Court 
held that such benefits "are a matter of statutory entitlement 
for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination 
involves state action that adjudicates important rights."132 
Termination of benefits deprives the welfare recipient of "the 
means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical 
care."133 The Court concluded that the same considerations 
which prompted the initial provision of welfare benefits, i.e., in 
providing for necessities, should govern their uninterrupted 
flow. 
The Court has since established guidelines for de-
termining when an entitlement exists in Board of Regents v. 
Roth 134 and its companion case, Perryv. Sindermann. rn Both 
cases involved termination of employment of state college 
professors. In determining whether the petitioner in Roth had 
been deprived of a protected property interest, the Court noted 
that "unilateral expectation" of benefits is not sufficient. The 
Court explained that property interests "are created and 
defined by existing rules or understandings that secure certain 
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits." 136 Because the refusal to rehire came at the end of the 
teacher's first one-year contract with no indication by the 
school that it would renew the agreement, the Court held that 
the teacher was not entitled to a hearing on his termination. 
In Sindermann. the Court noted the college policy of 
rehiring faculty members for as long as they performed 
satisfactorily, and decided that since the professor had been 
rehired for ten successive years, there was an objective basis for 
an expectation of contract renewal even though there was no 
formal acknowledgement of this policy by the college. 
Recognizing an unwritten "common law" rule that certain of 
the college employees had the equivalent ,..,ftenure, the Court 
determined that the teacher should be granted a hearing. 
Although Goldberg and Sindermann suggest that the 
en.titlement concept 137 should identify situations where an 
individual's dependency and reliance on continued 
distribution of government benefits is significant enough 138 to 
warrant procedural protection, the Court has since narrowed 
its view in Bishop v. Wood. 139 
In Bishop, a city police officer, discharged from his job 
without a hearing, claimed a due process property interest in 
continued employment. The ordinance defining the terms of 
his employment did not fix the duration of employment, and 
132. Id. at 262. 
133. Id. at 265. 
134. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
135. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
136. 408 U.S. at 577 (1972). 
137. For criticism of the entitlement doctrine and interest bal-
ancing approach to due process, see Note, Limits on Use of 
Interest &lancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975), and 
Comment, Entitlement. Enjoyment and Due Process of Law, 
1974 DUKE L. J. 89. 
138. However, in Roth the Court observed that to determine 
whether due process requirements apply in the first place, 
we must look not to the "weight," but to the nature of the 
interest at stake. 408 U.S. at 570-571 (1972). 
139. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). 
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listed several deficiencies for which an employee might be 
dismissed. The only process required to terminate an employee 
was written notice of the grounds for discharge. The Court 
noted that a property interest may be created by ordinance or 
implied contract, but held that the sufficiency of the claim of 
entitlement must be decided with reference to state law.140 
Under a North Carolina Supreme Court decision, an 
enforceable expectation of continued public employment 
.could exist only if the employer, by statute or contract, had 
actually granted some form of guarantee. The Court adopted 
the district court's construction of the ordinance that the police 
officer held his position at the will of the city, even though a 
contrary reading of the ordinance was possible, and held that 
there was no deprivation of a property interest protected by the 
due process clause. 
Bishop seems to indicate that a general inquiry into the 
legitimacy of expectations is no longer required, and that the 
Court may look instead to positive state law and judicial 
interpretations of that law to determine whether an 
entitlement exists. 141 It is not clear that the Bishop restriction 
of the entitlement doctrine, motivated by the Supreme Court's 
growing concern with reducing federal judicial interference 
with state decision-making, 142 should apply to evictions from 
units assisted by a federally designed low income housing 
program. Nevertheless, the following discussion will identify 
positive state (PHA) and federal rules which establish an 
entitlement to continued occupancy in Section 8 assisted units 
under the requirements of Bishop. 
Both conventional public housingl43 and FHA 
subsidized housing 144 tenants have successfully established a 
protectable property interest in the continued occupancy of 
their rental units. Court decisions finding entitlement to 
federally assisted low income housing are based on the 
principle that the tenants' interest in rem.aining in assisted units 
is more than a "unilateral .expectation;" the federal 
government has pledged itself to provide decent, safe, and 
sanitary dwellings for low income families and has enacted 
programs to meet this goal. 145 Courts have noted that the 
government policy of providing decent housing implies a 
commitment to promote "an atomosphere of stability, 
neighborliness, and social justice" 146 for low income tenants. 
Such a commitment creates an expectancy of continued 
occupancy in assisted units. In response to the reasoning of . 
140. Id. at 344. 
141. See 7he Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
58, 86-104 (1976). 
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142. Id. 
143. For example, Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 
F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1070), cert .. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 
(1971); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 
F.2d 937, 943 (2d Cir. 1974) (redevelopment authority 
housing). 
144. See. e.g .. Geneva Towers Tenant Organization v. Federated 
Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Caramico 
v. Secretary of HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974); Joy v. 
Daniels, 479 F.2d at 1241 (4th Cir. 1973); McQueen v. 
Drucker, 317 F.Supp. I 122 (D. Mass. 1970), affd, 438 F.2d 
781 (1st Cir. 1971). 
145. 42 U.S.C. §§1401 and J437f(a). 
146. McQueen v. Drucker, 317 F.Supp. at 1130 (D. Mass. 1970); 
quoted in Joy v. Daniels. 479 F.2d at 1240 (4th Cir. 1973). 
these courts, HUD has by regulation provided all public 
housing and subsidized housing tenants with the expectation 
that unless there is good cause for termination of tenancy, they 
may remain in assisted units. Thus, even though not all eligible 
families receive an assisted housing unit, unlike the Goldberg 
welfare situation where all eligible families receive benefits, all 
eligible families that actually receive assisted housing have a 
right to continued occupancy in the assisted unit unless good 
cause can be shown. 
The structure of the Section 8 program also provides the 
necessary basis for the Section 8 tenant's belief that his or her 
family is entitled to continuing benefits. All Section 8 
applicants must go through a screening process. To be eligible, 
a person must be of lower income and meet the PHA's 
definition of"family." 147 In addition, all tenants are protected 
from certain arbitrary and discriminatory practices. No person 
may be excluded from or be denied the benefits of the program 
on the ground of race, color or national origin. 148 Tenant 
leases may not contain certain lease clauses such as waiver of 
legal proceedings, confession of judgment, or exculpatory 
clauses. 149 No tenant may be discriminated against in the 
provision of services because of race, color, creed, religion, sex 
or national origin l50 or in existing housing, because they are a 
member of a class such as unmarried mothers or welfare 
recipients. 151 These rules indicate the government's 
recognition that Section 8 tenants need to be protected from 
certain practices in the private market. 
For the purpose of establishing an entitlement, the 
expectation of continued occupancy is easily applied to the 
Section 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation 
program. As with the public housing and subsidized housing 
tenants, the federal involvement is manifest to the tenant. But 
for the Section 8 statute and later assurances of Section 8 
program participation, the tenants' units would not have been 
built or substantially rehabilitated. The agreement between the 
Section 8 owner and the federal government is for an initial 
term of not more than five years subject to renewal for up to 20, 
or in some circumstances 40 years if the owner complies with 
necessary obligations. This expectation of continuing benefits 
is also applicable to the tenant for whose benefit the Section 8 
housing was created. Thus, as with public housing and 
subsidized housing, the government has created an 
expectation of continued occupancy in the Section 8 new 
construction and substantial rehabilitation programs. 
Under the Section 8 existing housing program there are 
two major difficulties in establishing an entitlement to 
continued occupancy of the assisted unit. First, the limited 
147. HUD defines an eligible "family" to include an elderly, 
mentally or physically handicapped, disabled or displaced 
person as well as those families whose income does not 
exceed limits set by HUD. See 24 C.F.R. §§880.102, 
881.102 and 882.102. 
148. See 42 U.S.C. §2000(d). 
149. See 24 C.F.R. §§880.219(c), 881.219(c), 882.210(!)(3), 
883.319(c) and 886.122(c). 
150. See 24 C.F.R. §§880.219(b), 881.219(b), 882 App. VI(f), 
883.219(b) and 886.122(b). 
151. See 24 C.F.R. §882 App. II ( n.1, Nondiscrimination 
in Housing provision in Housing Assistance Payments 
Contract). 
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duration of unit assistance poses a problem. The annual 
contributions contract (ACC) between the PHA and HUD is 
for a maximum of five years. The maximum term of the 
housing assistance payments contract between the PHA and 
owner is one to three years (congruent with the term of the 
lease) with a provision to renew up to a total of five years if a 
family continues in occupancy after the expiration of the one 
to three year term.152 Second, under HUD regulations, 153 the 
Certificate of Family Participation is viewed as the Section 8 
benefit, not the unit. If evicted, the family may relocate to 
another unit and continue to receive the benefit of the 
certificate. It is HU D's position that an eviction therefore does 
not interrupt the flow of the Section 8 benefit to the family. 
Although these program rules undermine the expectancy 
argument, there are several rebuttal arguments to be made 
which eliminate their impact. 
The duration problem may be overcome by looking to 
the maximum period of the lease and the payments contract. 
On the basis of the subsidized housing cases there is little doubt 
that a tenant cannot be evicted for other than good cause 
during the term of the lease, i.e., for one to three years up to a 
renewal total of five years. The 30-day notice to terminate 
provision 154 should not destroy the tenant's expectancy 
because of the regulation's simultaneous requirement that the 
landlord provide a lease of not less than one year. A reasonable 
construction of this dual requirement would be that the 
landlord must provide a lease for a minimum term of a year 
which could be terminated (actually not renewed) by either 
party giving 30 days' notice before the end of the year's term. 
An argument for an expectancy beyond the initial lease 
period, however, can be made based on the no'rmal practice in 
both federally assisted and private housing for the landlord 
and tenant to continue the initial lease period on a month-to-
month or renewal basis. In general, termination of such 
tenancies is the exception rather than the ruJe. 155 The 
expectancy of a Section 8 existing housing tenant therefore 
should be based on maximum period of the housing assistance 
payments contract. The Section 8 regulations provide that if a 
family continues in occupancy after the expiration of the term 
on the same terms and conditions as the original lease (or with 
changes to the lease approved by the PHA), the housing 
assistance contract shall continue in effect for the duration of 
such tenancy up to a total period of five years.156 Thus, under 
this view, existing housing tenants have an expectancy of five 
years of continued occupancy. 
A deprivation of occupancy within this five-year period 
would exceed the de minimis line recently drawn by the 
Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez.157 In Goss, the Court held a 
ten-day public school suspension to be a deprivation of a 
property interest of which students may not be deprived 
without notice and hearing. Surely a deprivation of any 
152. See 24 C.F.R. §882.107. 
153. See 41 Fed. Reg. 43330 (Sept. 30, 1976). 
154. 24 C.F.R. §882.107. 
155. See Comment at 886, supra note 130. See also Comment, 
Due Process Protection Under the Entitlement Doctrine for 
Tenants of Federa/(1• Supported Housing, 6 GEORG. L. J. 
130 I (1975). 
156. 24 C.F.R. §882.!07. 
157. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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duration prior to the expiration of the housing assistance 
payments contract period should constitute a protectable 
interest. 
Even if the expectancy is found to be for only the period 
of the initial lease, under certain circumstances, a Section 8 
tenant should not be subject to eviction at the end of the term 
of the lease merely because the landlord claims he or she no 
longer wants to keep that particular unit in the program. For 
example, if the tenant has complied with terms and conditions 
of the lease, but the landlord wants to evict the particular 
tenant claiming that the unit is no longer under the Section 8 
program, the termination should not be permitted because the 
landlord should not be able to indirectly act in retaliation 
against the tenant. 158 Under this principle, the landlord should 
not be permitted to take just one unit off the Section 8 market 
if the landlord continues to participate in the program by 
maintaining other units.159 
The second major difficulty in establishing an 
entitlement to continued occupancy of an existing housing 
unit, HU D's position that the Section 8 benefit is attached to 
the family and not the unit, may be overcome upon closer 
examination of the Certificate of Family Participation as the 
Section 8 "benefit." The Certificate merely indicates that the 
family is eligible to receive Section 8 benefits if it finds a rental 
unit which meets the family's needs and later receives final 
approval from the P HA. 160 Possession of the specific housing 
unit at an affordable rent constitutes the tangible benefit to the 
tenant. 
Along with the Section 8 rental unit, the tenant acquires 
a "housing bundle" which includes participation in a 
neighborhood, access to shops and schools, services, 
transportation and other less tangible benefits attached to a 
specific unit. Eviction may mean a loss of these benefits as well 
as loss of the unit. Because of the shortage of housing for low 
and very low income families, there is no assurance that the 
family will be able to relocate in a decent, safe and sanitary unit 
after eviction, 161 much less find another unit in the same 
158. Cf Silva v. East Providence Housing Authority, 423 F.Supp. 
453, 461 (D. R.I. 1976), where city council and housing 
authority delayed construction of low income housing which 
had been contracted with HUD. Municipalities are forbidden 
from repudiating such cooperation agreements with HUD: 
"it would be anomalous, to say the least, and quite de-
structive of national housing policy, if the officials of the 
City and EPHA whose opposition and delay caused HUD 
to terminate (the project) were permitted to accomplish by 
indirection what they are barred from accomplishing by 
direct action." 
159. See Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 
867 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (landlord may go out of business 
entirely if he wishes to do so but his right to discontinue 
rental of all of his units does not justify a partial closing 
designed to intimidate remaining tenants in connection with 
retaliatory eviction defense after tenant's assertion of hous-
ing code violations). The danger of this approach is that an 
owner who maintains only a few Section 8 units could 
decide to terminate them all to avoid good cause eviction 
requirements for one tenant. 
160. 24 C.F.R. §882.209. 
161. See ge;,era/(1• Owens v. Housing Authority of City of 
Stanford, 394 F.Supp. 1267, 1271 (D. Conn. 1975) (public 
housing eviction constituted irreparable injury because of 
scarcity of low.income housing). 
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neighborhood. If a family must move to another PHA 
jurisdiction to find housing after an eviction, the family may be 
forced to compete with all other applicants for another 
Certificate. 162 Finally, there are substantial financial costs to 
any tenant who is required to move; moving costs and storage 
expenses are particularly burdensome for low income tenants. 
All of these factors argue against the interpretation of 
possession of the Certificate as the benefit rather than 
occupancy of the unit. 
In summary, entitlement to continued occupancy in 
Section 8 newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated 
units may easily be established under the reasoning of previous 
cases. Entitlement to continued occupancy of Section 8 
existing housing units is more difficult to establish under 
present HUD rules, but these rules may be successfully 
challenged by the concepts of a five year expectancy and the 
"occupancy" theory of benefit. 
B. Balancing the Interests of the Tenant, the 
Private Landlord, and the Government: Right 
to a Good Cause Hearing 
Once state action and entitlement to continued 
occupancy are established, courts must determine the 
appropriate procedural safeguards under Goldberg 163 by 
weighing the tenant and government interest in avoiding 
interruption of the government Section 8 benefit against the 
government's interest (and.the private landlord's interest) in a 
summary procedure. As the Supreme Court recently outlined 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 164 it is a balancing process: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due 
process generally requires consideration of three 
distinct faccors: first, the private interest that 
will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such in-
terest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or sub-
stitute procedural safeguards, and finally, the 
governmental interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute pro-
cedural requirement would entail.165 
In Eldridge the Court distinguished the welfare 
termination procedure invalidated by Goldberg and held that 
due process did not require an evidentiary hearing prior to the 
termination of Social Security disability benefits _not based on 
financial need. The present and proposed Section 8 eviction 
procedures should be examined in light of the three factors 
outlined in Eldridge. 
The first factor to be considered under the Eldridge 
standard is the private interest. The tenants' interest in 
continued occupancy, as discussed above, 166 is in the financial 
162. 24 C.F.R. §882.209(e)(2). 
163. 397 U.S. at 262-3 (1970). 
164. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
165. Id. at 335. 
166. See textual discussion accompanying notes 161 and 162. 
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and social benefits derived from continued occupancy of the 
unit chosen by the tenant to meet the family's needs. The 
government shares the tenants' interest in stability through its 
stated objective of affording every American decent, safe, and 
sanitary housing and of encouraging stable communities.167 
The arbitrary eviction of assisted families runs counter to this 
shared private and governmental objective. In addition, since 
Section 8 benefits are based on· financial need, the tenants' 
interest is similar to that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg. 
Deprivation of the Section 8 benefit means that a tenant would 
be forced to accept a substandard dwelling in the private 
market, or in the alternative, to pay much higher rent for 
satisfactory housing and therefore live without other 
necessities such as food, clothing and medical care. The private 
owner's interest in administrative convenience must also be 
considered. The government shares this interest through its 
goal of attracting private participation in the program. 
The risk of erroneous deprivation of Section 8 benefits is 
the second factor to be considered under Eldridge. Under the 
existing housing program, the PHA must send the notice to 
vacate and authorize the eviction. In practice, however, most 
PH As authorize any request for an eviction ifthe allegation of 
the landlord presents a reason that would be sustainable under 
the lease. For example, it is possible that if a landlord 
represents to the PHA that a tenant has a dog in violation of a 
lease provision, the PHA would authorize the eviction without 
further investigation. The fact that the tenant maintains that 
he does not own a dog and that the culprit belongs to the 
neighbors may not be considered by the PHA. Another 
situation which arises is the retention of security deposits by 
the landlord. PH As often do not investigate a landlord's claim 
for the security deposit and automatically approve payment. 
As a result, the landlord uses the additional funds for repairs 
on the unit (repairs which needed to be done when the tenant 
moved in and not as a result of occupancy), and the tenant 
loses the Section 8 benefit through the PHA policy of not 
providing a relocation certificate for a family which 
"damaged" a unit. Without a prior hearing, the tenant has no 
way of preventing an erroneous deprivation. 
For the new construction and substantial rehabilitation 
program the problem is even more pronounced. There are no 
procedural protections for tenants unless the owner wants 
vacancy benefits for the 60-day period subsequent to the 
eviction, in which case the landlord must certify that ten-day 
notice was given and that the eviction did not violate the lease, 
contract or any applicable law. No hearing is provided and 
HUD has no mechanism to check on arbitrary evictions by the 
owner. The tight housing market makes the risk of deprivation 
particularly troublesome for low income tenants. A late rent 
payment may automatically result in eviction when a welfare 
check arrives a few days late or when a tenant is temporarily 
laid off from work. There is also the risk that a tenant may be 
evicted for the actions of others. For example, a tenant may be 
evicted for damage to the unit, such as a broken window 
caused by children in the neighborhood. During a tight 
market, the landlord has little incentive to investigate such 
matters. 
167. 42 U.S.C. §1441a. 
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Since there is considerable risk of erroneous deprivation 
of Section 8 benefits through present procedures, the probable 
value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards must 
be considered. In Eldridge, the Court determined that the 
written medical assessment of a worker's condition is a more 
easily documented decision than the typical determination of 
welfare entitlement where "a wide variety of information may 
be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and 
veracity often are critical to the decision making process." 168 
The Court further distinguished the welfare termination 
procedure in its failure to provide an effective means for the 
recipient to communicate his case to the decision-maker. 
Written submissions were unrealistic because most recipients 
lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write 
effectively" and could not afford legal counseJ.169 A Section 8 
tenant, like the welfare recipient 110 in Goldberg, would benefit 
greatly from the opportunity to make an oral presentation 
before a decision-maker. 
A final factor to be considered under the Eldridge 
standard is the governmental interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens the 
additional procedures would entail. The government's interest 
is twofold and potentially conflicting. The government shares 
the tenants' interest in the stability of continued occupancy. 
On the other hand, the government also has an interest in 
private owner participation i11 the Section 8 program. If 
governmental due process • standards are imposed on 
landlords, many private owners may be uninterested in 
participating in the program, especially if they can easily rent 
the same unit ·to nonassisted families who could be evicted 
without due process procedures. 
In balancing these interests, courts could arrive at 
alternative applications of a good cause eviction standard 
which would not be too costly to the government in terms of 
undue administrative burdens or endangering the success of 
1 
the Section 8 program.171 Under the existing program, the 
168. 424 U.S. at 343-344 (1976) .. 
169. Id. at 345. 
170. A substantial percentage of tenants in conventional public 
housing and subsidized housing receive public assistance. 
Of the 388,432 families recertified for continued occupancy 
in public housing during the 12-month period ending 
September 30, 1976, 77 percent received assistance and/ or 
benefits and 45 percent received assistance with or without 
benefits (Table H-120). Of the 136,826 families certified for 
occupancy in §236 housing during the same time period, 
93 percent received assistance and/ or benefits and 80 per-
cent received assistance with or without benefits (Table 
H-60). Of the 93,203 families recertified for occupancy in 
§236 housing, 95 percent received assistance and/ or benefits 
and 77 percent received assistance with or without benefits 
(Table H-68). "Assistance" is defined as funds given on 
the basis of need by organizations, some private, but 
primarily public. "Benefits" are non-salary funds not given 
on the basis of need by governmental agencies (See note 
to Table H-67). 1976 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE 
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DE-
VELOPMENT, (Washington, D.C.). Similar information on 
Section 8 families was unavailable. 
171. For a more detailed discussion of possible acceptable solu-
tions. see Note, supra note 130 at 1190-1196. 
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PHA could apply its existing model grievance procedure 
mechanism 172 to Section 8 tenants. This procedure provides 
for notice, an informal hearing, access to documents and PHA 
records relied upon in the eviction, personal appearances 
before an impartial decision-making body, and a right to a trial 
de novo. Since the PHA already is responsible for 
authorization of Section 8 evictions from existing units, this 
procedure would not add excessive burdens to the PHA 
administration of the program. 
Harm to the landlord is minimal because of safeguards 
within the grievance procedure. For example, unless rent due 
is deposited in an escrow account during the course of the 
proceedings, the hearing procedure may be deemed waived. 173 
If tenant behavior is hazardous to the health and safety of 
other tenants, the landlord may avoid the model 
procedures. 174 Although the grievance procedure may 
constitute some measure of inconvenience to the landlord, on 
balance, the tenants' interest in an inexpensive hearing should · 
prevail. 
Application of the good cause standard to new 
construction or substantial rehabilitation not administered by 
the PHA could be accomplished in ways similar to the good 
cause eviction standard for subsidized housing.11s Courts have 
indicated that a federal good cause eviction standard may be 
incorporated as a defense in state judicial eviction proceedings 
as a way of meeting due process requirements. 176 This 
mechanism would present no undue burden to the landlord 
because of the necessity to go to court anyway. The good cause 
requirement would merely require the landlord to give reasons 
for the eviction and would give the tenant a right to produce 
evidence of a contrary position. 
An alternative procedure would be to require HUD to 
implement an impartial hearing procedure on the issue of good 
cause for proposed evictions. The need for an informal hearing 
prior to the court proceeding is now under consideration by 
HUD for subsidized housing. 177 Requiring the landlord and 
tenant to talk in an informal setting may eliminate the cost to 
both parties of the evictioh and rerental through the result of 
reaching agreement prior to legal action. Such a hearing 
should not eliminate the right to a trial de nova. Whatever the 
solution, tenants should be afforded a right to an adjudication 
of facts prior to an eviction, and landlords should be protected 
by a process with as little delay and inconvenience as possible 
consistent with a good cause requirement. 
On balance, then, some type of prior evidentiary hearing 
should be established to protect Section 8 tenants from 
172. 24 C.F.R. §§866.50, et seq. 
173. 24 C.F. R. §866.55(e). 
174. 24 C.F.R. §866.5l(a). 
175. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson 
v. Denny, 365 F.Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973); Appel v. 
Beyer, 39 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 114 Cal.Rptr. 336 (1974): 
176. Where state summary procedures do not afford tenants the 
opportunity to present federal constitutional defenses, 
administrative hearings should be required. See Owens v. 
Housing Authority of City of Stanford, 394 F.Supp. 1267, 
1273 (D. Conn. 1975). 
177. See 24 C.F.R. §§450 et seq .. 41 Fed. Reg. 43329 (Sept. 
30. 1976). 
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arbitrary ev1ct10ns. The good cause standard should be 
instituted at the hearing, whether it be a PHA administrative 
hearing or a judicial proceeding. Under the standards of 
Goldberg and Eldridge, an oral presentation prior to eviction 
would be the most appropriate means to safeguard Section 8 
tenants' entitlement to an uninterrupted flow of Section 8 
assistance. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Predictions regarding the success of establishing a good 
cause eviction standard for Section 8 tenants vary according to 
the special provisions and characteristics of the Section 8 
subprograms. Although chances of establishing state action 
appear most favorable in the existing housing program 
because of PHA authorization of the eviction, existing 
housing tenants will encounter relatively more difficulty in 
justifying application of the good cause standard under the due 
process entitlement doctrine because of HUD's interpretation 
that the Certificate of Family Participation rather than the 
unit constitutes the Section 8 benefit. 
The balance falls the other way for the new construction 
and substantial rehabilitation program. There are more 
obstacles to showing the requisite state or governmental 
action, but once it is established, application of the good cause 
eviction standard to private developers follows by analogy to 
the subsidized housing cases. 
Although it is difficult to generalize, based on principles 
already established for the conventional public housing and 
FHA subsidized housing programs, a sound argument can be 
made for the establishment of both a due process good cause 
standard and a prior evidentiary hearing for tenants faced with 
eviction from Section 8 assisted housing. 
ENERGY ISSUES AFFECTING THE POOR: 
A PRELIMINARY SURVEY 
by Allison Beck* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The past winters of severely cold weather and the 
resulting energy problems have had a startling impact on the 
lives of most Americans. Sacrifices are being requested, or in 
many cases required, of all - rich and poor. But there can be 
no doubt that those who have little or nothing to begin with 
will suffer the most when asked to conserve or cut back; the 
poor have no margin for saving. The need for providing 
specific and direct attention and remedies to the energy 
problems of low income Americans is apparent. To heat 
homes, to drive to work or to the grocery store, to cook meals 
- all involve the ability to pay for energy. Obviously, when it 
is freezing and there is no money to pay for fuel, any long-
range efforts to reduce the overall cost of energy to make it 
more affordable for the poor will seem remote at best. What 
• Consultant, Research Institute, Legal Services Corporation, 
· 733 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005. 
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they need is the fuel now, or the money to pay for it. The energy 
problem, therefore, must be considered on two levels: one 
requiring stop-gap solutions, the other requiring some 
comprehensive and long-range solutions. 
II. PROBLEMS REQUIRING IMMEDIATE, 
SHORT-TERM REMEDIES 
A. Unfair Credit Practices; Lack of Protective 
Services; Consumer Advocacy 
The 1973 Arab oil embargo introduced into the 
headlines the phrase "energy crisis." The embargo set the stage 
for the enactment of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
(EPAA), Pub.L. No. 93-159, but many of the regulations, 
allocation procedures and price controls imposed by that 
legislation have since been phased out. The EPAA also 
touched on the critical area of protective services. How large a 
deposit may a utility or fuel distributor demand before 
beginning service? What kind of notice must a customer be 
given before service is disconnected? What are valid reasons 
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